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Under group buying, quantity discounts are offered based on the buyers’ aggregated purchasing quantity, instead ofindividual quantities. As the price decreases with the total quantity, buyers receive lower prices than they otherwise
would be able to obtain individually. Previous studies on group buying focus on the benefit buyers receive in reduced
acquisition costs or enhanced bargaining power. In this paper, we show that buyers can instead get hurt from such co-
operation. Specifically, we consider a two-level distribution channel with a single manufacturer and two retailers who
compete for end customers. We show that, under linear demand curves, group buying is always preferable for symmetric
(i.e., identical) retailers. For asymmetric retailers (i.e., differing in market base and/or efficiency), group buying is beneficial
to the smaller (or less efficient) player. However, it can be detrimental to the larger (or more efficient) one. Despite the lower
wholesale price under group buying, the manufacturer can receive a higher revenue. Interestingly, group buying is more
likely to form when retailers are competitive in different dimensions. These insights are shown to be robust under general
nonlinear demand curves, except for constant elastic demand with low demand elasticity.
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1. Introduction
Under group buying (GB), quantity discounts are
offered based on buyers’ aggregated purchasing
quantity, instead of individual purchasing (IP) quan-
tities. As the price decreases with the total quantity,
there exist positive externalities among buyers that al-
low them to obtain lower prices than they otherwise
would be able to obtain individually. GB is widely
used for both business-to-business (B2B) and busi-
ness-to-consumer (B2C) transactions. In a B2B context,
co-operatives of independent grocers, convenience
stores, or retail hardware stores have long existed in
the United States as well as in Europe.1 Purchasing
consortia formed by independent companies are also
common in procuring computers, office furniture, or
utilities such as electricity and gas (Anand and Aron
2003). In some industries, such as food services and
health care, group purchasing organizations have a
dominant presence (Mitchell 2002). Sometimes buying
groups are also formed to meet minimum order
quantities imposed by sellers. Recently, the rapid de-
velopment of information technology has enabled
cooperation and transactions among geographically
distributed firms, which open up opportunities for
demand aggregation over a larger scale.
Most studies on B2B GB focus on the benefit buyers
receive in reduced acquisition cost or enhanced
bargaining power (Dana 2006). In this paper, we in-
vestigate situations where GB can be detrimental to
buyers. Specifically, we examine the impact of com-
petition on the formation of group purchase. Buying
groups are often concerned with the potential conflict
of interest when their members compete. In his survey
of more than 100 firms, Hendrick (1997) reports that a
majority (60%) of the purchasing consortia have mem-
berships consisting of noncompetitors only, whereas
10% are exclusively made up of direct competitors.
Some firms consider joining a competitor not the right
choice because ‘‘[they] do not want to help compet-
itors.’’ In fact, mistrust among competitors can be a
major hurdle for some (online) buying consortia (Gray
2003).
Various mechanisms have been introduced to
reduce competition between members, e.g., requiring
that members operate in tightly defined individual
territories (IGD Retailing Factsheets 2007). According
to the Canadian Garden Centre Co-op, benefits from
cooperation are possible because its members are not
immediate competitors. Nevertheless, some rival
companies do cooperate. PhotoFair Stores, a buying
group with members throughout New Jersey and
New York, was founded on the belief that it is ben-
eficial to be helpful to competitors. In 2006, two of the
main street supermarket rivals in United Kingdom,
The Co-operative Group and Spar UK, joined forces in
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a buying alliance to pool volumes in targeted areas of
own label products. Both firms stressed that they
would remain independent and collaborate only in
buying, while maintaining ‘‘healthy and friendly
competition’’ (Grocer 2006). Thus, it remains unclear
whether two competing firms should ever cooperate
in purchasing.
In this paper, we consider a two-level distribution
channel consisting of a single seller (manufacturer)
who offers a quantity discount schedule and two re-
tailers who compete in the final market by selling to
end customers. The market starts with an equilibrium
where the retailers act individually in deciding their
purchase quantities (i.e., IP). We examine the retailers’
decision of whether to purchase together (i.e., GB) in
order to obtain lower wholesale prices.
Under GB, two effects influence retailers’ profits:
the cooperation effect through demand aggregation, and
the competition effect in the final market. Depending on
whether retailers are symmetric (i.e., identical) or
asymmetric (i.e., differing in market base and/or effi-
ciency), these effects influence retailers’ profits
differently. Using linear demand curves, we discover
a number of insights concerning the preference of re-
tailers on their purchasing strategies. For instance,
both retailers prefer GB under no competition. This is
consistent with the observation that cooperation
within buying organizations is becoming increasingly
popular in the public sector in particular, where there
is almost no competition (Schotanus 2007). Under
competition, symmetric retailers always prefer GB.
While mild competition is clearly preferable under IP,
symmetric retailers might enjoy higher profits under
more intense competition when they group purchase.
Also, a deeper discount from the manufacturer is not
always beneficial for buyers who purchase individu-
ally. When retailers mainly differ in one dimension
(i.e., market base or efficiency), GB is always attractive
for the smaller (or less efficient) retailer. However, it
can be detrimental to the larger (or more efficient) one.
Also, the manufacturer can receive a higher revenue,
despite the lower wholesale price under GB. Interest-
ingly, GB is more likely to form when retailers are
competitive in different dimensions. These insights
are shown to be robust under general nonlinear de-
mand curves, except for constant elastic demand with
low demand elasticity. We also briefly examine the
case of three retailers to shed light on the dynamics of
GB of multiple competing retailers.
In practice, retailers often face the opportunity of
group purchase. World Wide Retailer Exchange
(WWRE.com), the premier integrated worldwide ex-
change community, promotes the idea of demand
aggregation among its members, who are mostly large
retailers (e.g., Kroger, Safeway, CVS, Walgreens, etc.).
In Europe, purchasing consortia are well established
for the retail sector (Zentes and Swoboda 2000). In
Italy, the top five buying groups account for almost
84% of the food retail market (Kuipers 2005). In
United States and Canada, with the majority of fur-
niture coming from overseas, independent retailers
who do not get on board with a buying group often
find themselves having a hard time surviving (Heist
2008). Similarly, dealers of electronics and appliances
start purchasing together as they realize that they
cannot continue to purchase products via traditional
distribution and remain competitive (Knott 2009).
Most buying groups claim that they can generate
significant savings for their members. The appliance
retailer Filco receives rebates of 4–6% of total pur-
chases through its affiliation with the Selective
Consolidated Dealers Co-Op. Members of Star furni-
ture, a buying group based in Salem, Virginia, receive
rebates on orders averaging 2–5%, with some rebates
reaching 10% (Rauen 1992). However, not all retailers
engage in GB. While this can be explained by coor-
dination efforts or purchase timing required for GB,
we show that competition could also deter coopera-
tion. Thus, our study offers another possible
explanation of why some retailers may not join group
purchase.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper
that studies GB in a distribution channel. In particular,
we fully characterize the competition between two re-
tailers, with and without GB. Our study generalizes the
existing knowledge on GB by considering a number of
structure features: price-sensitive market demand, di-
rect competition in the marketplace, and general
quantity discount schedules. Results of this paper help
managers to better understand the dynamics of coop-
eration in purchasing and provide guidelines for their
decisions in a competitive environment. Although our
model concerns the retailers, the framework developed
here can be extended to other settings, such as GB of
competing manufacturers.
The outline of the paper is as follows. A review of
the relevant literature is presented in section 2. We
introduce the model and describe the equilibrium so-
lutions in section 3, and present our results with
discussions in section 4. Section 5 considers two ex-
tensions: nonlinear demand curves and multiple
retailers. Section 6 concludes.
2. Literature Review
Our paper is related to several research streams, including
quantity discounts, competition in distribution channels,
group buying, and inventory centralization games.
Quantity discounts have been extensively studied
from one of three viewpoints: price discrimination
(Buchanen 1953, Oi 1971), channel coordination (Jeu-
land and Shugan 1983, Ingene and Parry 1995, 1998,
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Raju and Zhang 2005), and operational efficiency
(Crowther 1964, Dada and Srikanth 1987, Erhun et al.
2008, Monahan 1984). Some studies combine the last
two streams by considering channel coordination
with price-sensitive demand and operating costs
(Chen et al. 2001, Weng 1995). Interested readers are
referred to the reviews in Dolan (1987) and Weng
(1995). Our work is close to the marketing literature
on channel coordination. Jeuland and Shugan (1983)
first discuss how quantity discounts could be used to
maximize channel profits. Ingene and Parry (1995)
introduce competing retailers to the quantity discount
literature. Raju and Zhang (2005) study channel co-
ordination in the presence of a dominant retailer.
Similar to Ingene and Parry (1995), we consider a
single manufacturer offering quantity discounts to
competing retailers. However, our work focuses on
the retailers’ decision of whether to group purchase,
whereas most papers in this area examine channel
coordination. Moreover, we allow the discount to be
based on the total quantity, instead of on the IP quan-
tities as in most quantity discount studies.
In terms of competition in distribution channels,
our work is closely related to Tsay and Agrawal
(2000), who explore channel coordination when re-
tailers compete in both price and service. They point
out that, due to model complexity, typically deter-
ministic formulations are found in most existing
multi-echelon analyses that incorporate demand com-
petition. Such models are common in economics (cf
Katz 1989, Tirole 1988 for reviews) and marketing lit-
erature (e.g., Choi 1991, Coughlan and Wernerfelt
1989, Ingene and Parry 1995, 1998, McGuire and Stae-
lin 1983, Moorthy 1987, Padmanabhan and Png 1997,
Trivedi 1998). Our model also considers deterministic
demands and price competition, but we focus on the
impact of competition on retailers’ GB decisions,
which has not been studied before.
Many theoretical and empirical studies on buyer
groups have emphasized enhanced buying power
that justifies the formation of buyer co-operatives,
buyer alliances, and horizontal mergers (e.g., Chipty
1995, Dana 2006, Horn and Wolinsky 1988, Inderst
and Wey 2003, Marvel and Yang 2008). Recently, Chen
et al. (2008) explore buyers’ bidding strategy under
different GB mechanisms in B2B exchanges. None of
the work considers competition among buyers.
While buying groups usually involve a long-term
relationship among buyers, recently developed web-
based GB allows demand to dynamically aggregate
online, so that price is set based on market-wide
demand. With demand uncertainty, GB (similar to
auctions) is a mechanism for price discovery. Anand
and Aron (2003) provide a survey of web-based prac-
tices of GB, and compare it with posted pricing under
uncertain demand. There is also a growing body of
literature that concerns B2C GB (Chen et al. 2002,
Kauffman and Wang 2002), in which demand uncer-
tainty plays an important role. We consider retailers’
routine purchase from the manufacturer, which in-
volves little uncertainty.
Finally, our work is related to the literature on in-
ventory centralization in a distribution system, in
which multiple independent retailers take advan-
tage of risk pooling in joint ordering under stochastic
demand (Anupindi et al. 2001, Chen 2009, Hartman
et al. 2000, Slikker et al. 2005). This stream of literature
does not consider retailer competition, which is our
focus.
3. Model Set-up and Analysis
Consider a two-level distribution channel where one
manufacturer sells a homogeneous good to two inde-
pendent retailers, who compete in the final market by
selling to end customers. The manufacturer’s unit
wholesale price is decreasing in the purchase quantity
(i.e., quantity discount). In the initial market equilib-
rium, each retailer acts individually in purchasing
from the manufacturer (i.e., IP). The retailers then
consider the option of purchasing together to obtain a
lower wholesale price (i.e., GB). GB is possible only
when both retailers agree to cooperate.
The retailers are indexed by iAf1, 2g and j5 3! i.
Retailer i’s demand, qi, decreases with its own price pi,
and increases with the opponent’s price pj. We first
consider a linear demand function
qi ¼ Ai ! pi þ yðpj ! piÞ; y & 0; ð1Þ
where Ai is the demand for retailer i when both prices
are set at zero and y measures substitutability between
the retailers. The above demand function can be de-
rived from the aggregate consumer utility function
(Lee and Staelin 2000, Shapley and Shubik 1969), and is
common in economic and marketing literature (see
Ingene and Parry 1995, McGuire and Staelin 1983, Tsay
and Agrawal 2000). We extend our model to several
common nonlinear demand functions in section 5.
Ai reflects the comparative advantage of retailer i in
terms of access to customers, due to factors such as
location, loyalty, brand, or service. While Ai captures
retailers’ differentiation in ‘‘market base,’’ y reflects
their competition intensity. There is no competition
when y5 0. We also assume that retailer i incurs an
operational cost ci in procuring and selling each unit
of the product. ci reflects the operational efficiency of
retailer i. Thus, our study focuses on the difference in
retailers’ access to customers and operational effi-
ciency, two common factors in the literature that
examines competing retailers (e.g., Ingene and Parry
1995, Tsay and Agrawal 2000).
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3.1. Quantity Discount Function (QDF)
According to the Robinson–Patman Act, a common
price menu must be offered to each buyer to preclude
sellers ‘‘from giving different terms to different re-
sellers in the same reseller class.’’ We assume that the
same price menu is offered under either individual or
group purchase. This is a reasonable assumption if the
manufacturer is selling to many retailers, and has no
knowledge of, or any control over the retailers’ deci-
sion regarding individual or group purchase.
Quantity discount schedules come in all shapes and
sizes. In a recent study, Schotanus et al. (2009) derive a
general continuous quantity discount function (QDF)
that describes the underlying function of different
discount schedules. Under the QDF, the unit whole-
sale price w(q) is
wðqÞ ¼ aþ d=qe; ð2Þ
where a & 0 is the base price, d is the discount scale, and
e is the steepness. They show that this QDF fits well
with 66 discount schedules found in practice, with e
varying from ! 1.00 to 1.60.
Note that de40 is required to ensure that the unit
wholesale price w(q) decreases with q. The higher the
discount scale d, the higher the wholesale price. When
e40, a5w(1) represents the minimum price,
whereas d5w(1)!w(1)40 reflects the price spread
of the schedule. When eo0, we have do0, and
a5w(0) is the maximum price. The absolute value
of the discount scale, |d|, reflects how fast w(q) de-
creases with q and is referred to as the discount level.
The higher the |d|, the more effective the demand
aggregation by the retailers.
In general, quantity discounts are deep for the initial
quantities and become flat as q gets large. Thus, we as-
sume w(q) is convex, which requires e & ! 1. Also for
total cost, TCðqÞ ¼ aqþ dq1!e, to be concave in q, we need
e ' 1. Hence, we restrict to eA[! 1,1], a range consistent
with the empirical findings (Schotanus et al. 2009). Note
that TC(q) is nondecreasing in q if e40. For eo0, we fol-
low Schotanus et al. (2009) by assuming q ' ðð!1þ eÞ
d=aÞ1=e so that TC(q) is increasing and w(q) remains non-
negative. We also assume that retailers do not engage in
any resale of the manufacturer’s product. Then under an
increasing and concave total cost function, no retailer will
purchase more than what he can sell in the final market.
When the steepness e5 1, w(q)5 a1d/q and the
price schedule is in fact a two-part tariff, where the
retailers share a lump-sum fee d and incur a unit price
a. When e5! 1, w(q)5 a1dq with do0, and the unit
wholesale price linearly decreases with quantity q.
Schotanus et al. (2009) report that five out of the 66
schedules collected have a steepness of ! 1. This dis-
count format is also common in the literature (Ingene
and Parry 1995, 1998, Rosenblatt and Lee 1985, Tsai
2007). We assume e 6¼0, as e5 0 is the trivial case of no
discount. Figure 1 depicts the possible range of dis-
count scale and steepness of the general QDF.
We assume that each retailer pays the same unit
wholesale price determined by the total quantity under
group purchase, referred to as uniform cost allocation
(Chen and Yin 2008). Such a payoff scheme is easy to
calculate, achieves budget balance (i.e., the total pay-
ments equal the total cost TC(q)), and hence is appealing
to the practitioners. For example, eWinWin.com, a major
online GB facilitator, uses this rule to allocate the total
cost after demand is aggregated through its online plat-
form. To focus on the effects of competition, we make the
common assumption that all model parameters are de-
terministic and common knowledge (e.g., Choi 1991,
Ingene and Parry 1995, 1998, Jeuland and Shugan 1983,
McGuire and Staelin 1983, Tsay and Agrawal 2000). For
ease of exposition, we assume zero coordination cost
under group purchase (which might involve adminis-
trative efforts such as phone calls or faxes). Such a (fixed)
coordination cost is likely to result in a threshold policy,
so the assumption can be easily relaxed without affecting
our results qualitatively.
3.2. Individual Purchasing
We start with the initial market equilibrium where,
given the discount schedule, each retailer acts indi-
vidually in deciding its own retail price and purchase
quantity. Under IP, retailer i’s wholesale price, w(qi),
depends on its own purchasing quantity qi. With a per
unit operating cost ci, retailer i’s profit function is
Pi ¼ ðpi ! ci ! wðqiÞÞqi: ð3Þ
Taking the first-order derivative with respect to pi
and setting it to 0 yield
@Pi
@pi
¼ 1þ ð1þ yÞw0ðqiÞ½ )qi ! ðpi ! ci ! wðqiÞÞð1þ yÞ
¼ 0: ð4Þ
e
d
High wholesale price
Deep discount
1
Infeasible 
Infeasible 
0
–1 
Two-part
tariff 
Linear
discount
Deep discount
Low wholesale price
When e > 0, a higher d means a deeper discount but also a higher wholesale price.
When e < 0, a lower d means a deeper discount and a lower wholesale price.
Flat discount
Flat discount 
Figure 1 Range of Discount Scale and Steepness of the Quantity Discount
Function
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Maximizing (3) with respect to pi and jointly solving
for both retail prices yield the equilibrium price pi
IP,
i5 1, 2. Closed-form solutions for pi
IP exist for e5 2, 1,
0, ! 1, and ! 2 only. As we focus on eA[! 1, 1], we
obtain the solution for e5 1 and ! 1 (see Table 1), and
explore the system behavior for other values of e
through numerical studies.
To focus on the impact of competition, we impose a
number of conditions on the parameters to ensure a rea-
sonable model with duopoly equilibrium under both IP
and GB (e.g., nonnegativity of prices, quantities, and
profits for both retailers).2 For the analysis of e5! 1 and
1, these conditions are explicitly described in (30)–(34)
and (36)–(38) in the supporting information Appendix
S1. For general steepness of e, we restrict our numerical
analysis to the range where these conditions hold.
Substituting pi
IP into (1) yields the equilibrium
quantity qi
IP. The total quantity is QIP5 q1
IP1q2
IP, and
the manufacturer’s revenue under IP is
RIP ¼ wðqIP1 ÞqIP1 þ wðqIP2 ÞqIP2 : ð5Þ
By (3) and (4), retailer i’s equilibrium profit under
IP, Pi
IP, can be written as
PIPi ¼
1
1þ y!
de
ðqIPi Þeþ1
" #
ðqIPi Þ2; i ¼ 1; 2: ð6Þ
Define A ¼: A1þA22 and DA ¼
: A1!A2
2 such that A15
A1DA and A25A!DA. Similarly, let c ¼: c1þc22 and Dc¼: c1!c22 such that c15 c1Dc and c25 c!Dc. DA and Dc
reflect the level of asymmetry between the retailers,
with which we can write the equilibrium solutions for
e5 1 and ! 1 as in Table 1. Note that DA and Dc are not
restricted to be positive. The superscripts l and t denote
linear schedules and two-part tariffs, respectively.
For each retailer, while a larger market base A is
always beneficial, a higher operational cost c or base
price a will be detrimental. Thus, A! c! a reflects the
environment in which retailers operate, and remains
positive throughout the paper. As seen in Table 1, a
higher A! c! a leads to higher quantity and profit
under IP. Note that QIP does not depend on DA or Dc
under either linear discounts or two-part tariffs. Later
we will show that, for the general QDF, the total quan-
tity under IP decreases with the level of asymmetry.
3.3. Group Buying
We now consider the option of cooperation in pur-
chasing between the retailers. Under GB, each retailer
i’s wholesale price, w(Q), depends on the total pur-
chasing quantity, Q5 qi1qj. The profit function of
retailer i is
Pi ¼ ðpi ! ci ! wðQÞÞqi: ð7Þ
Taking the first-order derivative with respect to pi
and setting it to 0 yield
@Pi
@pi
¼ ð1þ w0ðQÞÞqi ! ðpi ! ci ! wðQÞÞð1þ yÞ
¼ 0: ð8Þ
Maximizing (7) with respect to pi and jointly solving
for both retail prices yield the equilibrium price pi
GB,
i5 1, 2. Again, closed-form solutions exist for e5 2, 1,
0, ! 1, and ! 2, but we will obtain the results for e5 1
and ! 1 only (see Table 2). We then obtain the cor-
responding quantity qi
GB by substituting pi
GB into (1).
Table 1 Equilibrium Solutions under Individual Purchasing (e = ! 1 and 1)
Linear schedule (e5 ! 1) Two-part tariff (e5 1)
Retailer price pIP li ¼ AXþaþcXþ1 * DAXþDcð1þ2yÞXþ1 pIP ti ¼ Aþ aþcð Þð1þyÞ2þy * DAþDcð1þyÞ2þ3y
Retailer quantity qIP li ¼ A!c!aXþ1 * DA!Dcð1þ2yÞð1þ2yÞXþ1 qIP ti ¼ ðA!c!aÞð1þyÞ2þy * DAð1þyÞ!Dcð1þ2yÞð1þyÞ2þ3y
Total quantity QIP l ¼ 2A!c!aXþ1 QIP t ¼ 2ðA!c!aÞð1þyÞ2þy
Retailer profit PIP li ¼ ðX ! dÞ qIP li
! "2 PIP ti ¼ ðqIP ti Þ21þy ! d
Sign 1(! ) is associated with retailer 1(2). X ¼: 11þyþ 2d :
Table 2 Equilibrium Solutions Under Group Buying (e = ! 1 and 1)
Linear schedule (e5 ! 1) Two-part tariff (e5 1)
Retailer price pGB li ¼ AYþaþcYþ1 * DAðY!2dÞþDcð1þ2yÞðY!2dÞþ1 pGB ti ¼ A! Q
GB t
2 *
DAþDcð1þyÞ½ ) QGB tð Þ2 !dDA
QGB tð Þ2ð2þ3yÞ!dð1þ2yÞ
Retailer quantity qGB li ¼ A!c!aYþ1 * DA!Dcð1þ2yÞð1þ2yÞðY!2dÞþ1 qGB ti ¼ Q
GB t
2 *
½DA!Dcð1þ2yÞ)ð1þyÞ QGB tð Þ2
QGB tð Þ2ð2þ3yÞ!dð1þ2yÞ
Total quantity QGB l ¼ 2A!c!aYþ1 QGB t ¼ ðA!c!aÞ 1þyð Þ2þy þ ðA!c!aÞ 1þyð Þ2þy
# $2 !dð1þ2yÞ2þy% &1=2
Retailer profit PGB li ¼ ðY ! 2dÞ qGB li
! "2 PGB ti ¼ qGB tið Þ21þy 1! d QGB t! "!2h i
Sign1(! ) is associated with retailer 1(2). Y ¼: 1þd1þy þ 2d :
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The manufacturer’s revenue under GB is given by
RGB ¼ wðQGBÞ qGB1 þ qGB2
! "
: ð9Þ
From (7) and (8), we can write retailer i’s equilib-
rium profit under GB as
PGBi ¼
1
1þ y
' (
1! de
QGBð Þeþ1
 !
qGBi
! "2
;
i ¼ 1; 2:
ð10Þ
Table 2 summarizes the equilibrium solutions for
e5 1 and ! 1 under GB.
4. Comparison of IP and GB
In this section, we compare the two models (IP and
GB) for each retailer in order to find, if they exist, the
conditions making cooperation in the form of GB
suitable in a competitive environment. We first ana-
lyze the case of symmetric retailers (i.e., Ai5Aj,
ci5 cj). This is an important case because many buy-
ing groups consist of members of similar sizes, while
it is unclear how competition affects their purchasing
and pricing decisions. For differentiated retailers, we
focus on their differences in access to customers and
operational efficiency represented by market base and
unit operational cost, respectively. We first explore
retailers’ decisions under asymmetry in the market
base, assuming that they have the same operational
costs (i.e., DA 6¼0, Dc5 0). For the case of asymmetry in
efficiency (i.e., DA5 0, Dc6¼0), the results do not differ
qualitatively. The general case with asymmetry in
both dimensions (i.e., DA6¼0, Dc6¼0) is discussed at the
end.
4.1. Symmetric Retailers
For symmetric retailers, at the equilibrium we have
pi5 pj under either IP or GB. Under the general QDF,
we have wðqiÞ ¼ aþ d=qei , with which we can simplify
the first-order condition (FOC) under IP (4) as
A! c! a ¼ 2þ y
1þ y qi þ
d
qei
ð1! eÞ; i ¼ 1; 2: ð11Þ
Similarly, under GB we have wðQÞ ¼ aþ d=Qe, so
that the FOC (8) becomes
A! c! a ¼ 2þ y
1þ y qi þ
d
2eþ1qei
2! e
1þ y
' (
;
i ¼ 1; 2:
ð12Þ
Although closed-form solutions do not exist for
general steepness e, we obtain several results for sym-
metric retailers based on Equations (11) and (12).
PROPOSITION 1 (Effect of competition intensity). When
the retailers are symmetric, a higher competition level y
leads to lower retail price and higher demand under both IP
and GB, as well as lower profit under IP. However, under
GB retailer profit will increase with y when
A! c! að Þe42qGBi ðyþ eþ eyÞ= 1þ 2yð Þ. That is, more
intense competition can result in higher retailer profit un-
der GB.
See the supporting information Appendix S1 for
proofs of all the propositions.
Results on how retail price and demand quantity
change with y are intuitive. Basically, competition
exerts downward pressure on retail prices, so that
demand quantities increase with y. Conventional wis-
dom suggests that firms prefer less intense compe-
tition, as confirmed by the result that retailer profit
decreases with y under IP. However, under GB retailer
profit will increase with y when A! c! að Þe4
2qGBi ðyþ eþ eyÞ= 1þ 2yð Þ. For e5 1 (two-part tariffs),
this condition can be reduced to d4ðA! c! aÞ2y=
ð1þ 2yÞ, so retailer profit increases with competition
for deep discount (high d) and low competition (small
y). For e5! 1 (linear discount), we have do0 and
the condition is reduced to |d| & 1/2 or y ' jdj=
ð1! 2jdjÞ. For general steepness e, numerical investi-
gation confirms that this result holds for deep
discount (high |d|) and mild competition (low y).
Figure 2 depicts how retailer profit under GB changes
with y for positive steepness of e, where PiGB increases
with y for y small. The result for negative steepness is
similar.
Retailer competition in general leads to higher de-
mand in the final market, and consequently lower
unit wholesale price under the manufacturer’s quan-
tity discount. Under deep discount and mild
competition, this effect is strengthened through group
0.04
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.045
0.05
0.055
0.06
0.065
e = 0.1
e = 0.5
e = 0.9
_GBΠ
Figure 2 Group Buying Profit Changes With Competition Level h (A= 1,
c= 0.1, a= 0.3, d= 0.1, e40)
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purchase so that each retailer’s profit increases with
competition level y. However, when the discount is not
significant or competition is already fierce, a more in-
tense competition will further depress retail prices and
lower profits, passing most benefits on to consumers.
This possibly explains the present situation of German
grocery buying groups. In the food retail sector in Eu-
rope, buying groups are able to obtain significant
discounts from suppliers. However, Germany is
known for its fierce competition in food retailing,
and such discounts are passed on to final consumers in
lower prices. By contrast, competition among grocery
retailers is much less intense in France, United King-
dom, and Spain (Dobson Consulting 1999).
PROPOSITION 2 (Effect of discount scale). When retailers
are symmetric, a higher discount scale d leads to higher
retail price and lower demand under both IP and GB,
as well as lower profit under GB. However, under IP re-
tailer profit will increase with d when A! c! að Þe
4 2qIPi ð1þ eþ eyÞ= 1þ yð Þ. This implies that retailers
can get hurt from a lower wholesale price with deeper dis-
count under IP.
As shown in Figure 1, the higher the discount scale
d, the higher the unit wholesale price w(q). This in
general leads to higher retail price and lower retail
demand/profit, as is the case under GB. Under IP,
retailer profit also decreases with d under two-part
tariffs (@PIP ti =@d ¼ !1o0 for e5 1). However, for
linear discount schedules (e5! 1), a lower discount
scale d, or equivalently, a deeper discount level |d|,
can result in a lower retailer profit. In fact, for e5! 1,
the condition A! c! að Þeo 2qIPi ð1þ eþ eyÞ= 1þ yð Þ
can be reduced to d ' y!22ð1þyÞ, which will hold when d
is sufficiently low. This is because a fairly deep
discount can introduce very low retail prices that
essentially intensify retailers’ competition.
For general values of e, numerical studies show that
retailer profit under IP decreases with d for e40. For
negative e close to ! 1, retailer profit can increase with
d, as illustrated in Figure 3. For negative e close to 0,
retailer profit again decreases with d under mild
competition, although the result might reverse when
competition is sufficiently high. In reality, the discount
level varies across industries. For the optical buying
group ADO, the discount percentage for various
eyewear models goes from 3% up to 30%. Proposition
2 suggests that retailers may not always prefer deeper
discounts under IP. Interestingly, this never happens
under GB, probably because the cooperation in
purchasing helps soften the competition when
discounts are deep. In fact, for symmetric retailers,
the cooperation effect will dominate the competition
effect and GB is always preferable, as shown in the
next proposition.
PROPOSITION 3 (Comparison between IP and GB). With
symmetric retailers, retail quantity (price) will be higher
(lower) under GB if yoby, with by ¼ e=½2! 2eþ1ð1! eÞ) ! 1.
Retailer profit is always higher under GB with a lower unit
wholesale price. However, it is possible for the manufacturer
to have higher revenue under GB.
Although retailers are able to get a lower unit
wholesale price under GB, they do not necessarily
purchase more. As a result, the total quantity is not
always higher under GB. When y4by, the fierce com-
petition pushes each retailer to over purchase in order
to qualify for a deeper discount under IP. Under GB,
since the discount is based on aggregated demand,
each retailer might scale back and buy less, resulting
in higher retail prices in the final market. That is, re-
tailers’ cooperation might hurt end consumers.3 In
particular, when e5 1, we have by ¼ !1=2, so demand
quantity is always lower under GB (qGBi ' qIPi ) for two-
part tariffs. However for e5! 1, we have by ¼1, so
quantity is always higher under GB (qGBi & qIPi ) for
linear discounts.
For profit comparison, the message is more consis-
tent. GB avails a deeper discount based on the total
quantity, and effectively improves each retailer’s
profit. Thus, symmetric retailers who face fierce com-
petition might consider cooperation as a mechanism
to soften competition and improve profits. This is
consistent with the observation that, while buying
groups operate in various industries, they are most
active in competitive retailing businesses such as
appliances, jewelry, and consumer electronics (Rauen
1992). Table 3 summarizes the comparison for sym-
metric retailers.
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In general, GB leads to a lower unit wholesale price
and consequently a lower revenue for the manufac-
turer. In fact, this is always the case under two-part
tariffs. However, for linear quantity discount sched-
ules, if the base price a is above certain threshold a0
(see proof in the supporting information Appendix S1
for details), the manufacturer will receive a higher
revenue when retailers cooperate. To see this, recall
that RIP ¼ 2qIPi wðqIPi Þ, RGB ¼ 2qGBi wð2qGBi Þ, qIPi oqGBi ,
and wðqIPi Þ4wð2qGBi Þ under linear discounts. When
base price a increases, both qi
GB and qi
IP are decreasing,
which leads to higher wholesale prices. However, this
impact is reinforced under GB because w(2qi
GB) lin-
early decreases with the total quantity 2qi
GB, resulting
in a reduced gap between w(qi
IP) and w(2qi
GB). When a
is high enough, the higher quantity under GB will
overcome the lower wholesale price, yielding a higher
revenue under GB. If a higher revenue is preferable
for the manufacturer, GB can create win–win for all
the players. Numerical analysis confirms that this re-
sult holds for general steepness e not close to 1, as
shown in Figure 4.
In practice, we often observe co-ops or buying
groups of similar-size stores (e.g., Ace Hardware).
While this can be explained by their common back-
ground and interests, our analysis provides further
support for such cooperation even in the presence of
competition. Some buying groups, e.g., FurnitureFirst,
have requirements on the geographical location to
prevent members from competing with each other
(Heist 2008). The cleaning supplies buying group,
DPA, typically has one distributor in a given market.
On the other hand, buying group AFFLINK reasons
that competition can be a benefit (Mollenkamp 2005).
Proposition 3 shows that for symmetric retailers com-
petition may not be a concern if they want to
cooperate in buying. Moreover, under certain condi-
tions, the more intense the competition, the higher the
profit under GB as suggested in Proposition 1.
4.2. Asymmetric Market Base
In the previous section, we show that GB helps soften
the competition between symmetric retailers. In prac-
tice, group members can also differ from each other.
The industrial supplies buying group IDC include
some members as small as US$2 million a year and
a few as large as over US$50 million a year. Furni-
tureFirst, a major US furniture buying group, has
members ranging from US$2 million up to US$30
million annually. In 2002, the French supermarket
group Intermarche, with sales totaling 37.2 billion
Euros, joined forces with its competitor, Spanish
Eroski, whose sales were much lower at 4.6 billion
Euros (Eurofood 2002). In this section, we examine re-
tailers’ difference in their access to customers while
assuming they are equally efficient (i.e., Ai6¼Aj, ci5 cj).
Without loss of generality, we consider positive DA
only. That is, retailer 1 has a larger market base than
retailer 2. We first study whether retailers’ asymmetry
level affects the total quantity and the manufacturer’s
revenue.
PROPOSITION 4. When retailers are asymmetric in market
base,
(a) under IP the total quantity (QIP) and the manufac-
turer’s revenue (RIP) are nonincreasing in DA.
(b) under GB, the total quantity (QGB) and the manu-
facturer’s revenue (RGB) remain constant with DA,
whereas DqGB ¼ qGB1 ! qGB2 is proportional to DA.
The total quantity (QGB) will increase with compe-
tition level y and decrease with discount scale d.
(c) the manufacturer’s revenue under GB can be higher
or lower than that under IP.
For IP, the total quantity QIP decreases or remains
constant (e.g., under linear quantity discounts and
two-part tariffs) with the asymmetry level DA, while
the manufacturer’s revenue RIP generally decreases
with DA. Thus, if a higher quantity and revenue are
desirable, the manufacturer would prefer symmetric
to asymmetric retailers.−0.8%
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Table 3 Comparison between Individual Purchasing and Group Buying
(Symmetric Retailers)
Retailers Manufacturer
Retailer price pIPi 4p
GB
i if yoby Unit wholesale price wðqIPi Þ4w ð2qGBi Þ
Retailer quantity qIPi oqGBi if yoby Total quantity QIPoQGB if yoby
Retailer profit PGBi & PIPi Revenue RIPxRGB
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By contrast, under group purchase the total quan-
tity QGB and the manufacturer’s revenue RGB do not
depend on DA. That is, the manufacturer is indifferent
whether retailers are alike or different when they co-
operate in purchasing. The difference in retailers’
quantity, DqGB, is proportional to retailers’ level of
asymmetry. Intuitively, retailers buy more under in-
tense competition (higher y), whereas a higher
discount scale d leads to a higher wholesale price,
and thus lower quantity. Consistent with Proposition
3, the manufacturer’s revenue is not always lower
under GB for asymmetric retailers.
As the model is not tractable for general steepness e,
we will first present the analytical results for two spe-
cial cases: linear quantity discounts (e5! 1) and two-
part tariffs (e5 1), and explore the system behavior
under general steepness using a numerical approach.
4.2.1. Linear Quantity Discounts (e5! 1). When
e5! 1, the unit wholesale price is w(q)5 a1dq, with
do0. The equilibrium solutions under linear discount
schedules are given in Tables 1 and 2. The conditions
on the parameters that ensure nonnegativity of all
variables are described in (30)–(34) in the supporting
information Appendix S1. Note that when the
asymmetry level is too high, the small retailer may
not make any positive profit. Define DA ¼ ðA! c! aÞ
ð1þ2yÞXþ1
Xþ1 as the largest gap in market base under which
retailer 2 remains alive, and we will consider DA '
DA only. We first compare the price, quantity, and
profit of the two different retailers.
PROPOSITION 5. When retailers are asymmetric in market
base and discount is of linear format, under IP retailer 1
(with a larger market base) may or may not set a higher
retail price than retailer 2, although his quantity and
profit are always higher than retailer 2. Under GB the
retail price, quantity, and profit for retailer 1 are always
higher than retailer 2.
Under IP, retailer 1 naturally enjoys a competitive
advantage from its larger market base with a
higher quantity and profit, and the retail price is in
general higher than that of retailer 2. However, when
d ' ! 1/[2(11y)], or equivalently, |d| & 1/[2(11y)],
the deep discount from the manufacturer will mo-
tivate retailer 1 to set a lower price than retailer 2.
This result differs from Tsay and Agrawal (2000), in
which an asymmetry in market base always leads a
higher retail price by the larger retailer. This is be-
cause the unit wholesale price is fixed in Tsay and
Agrawal (2000), rather than decreasing in quantity as
in our study. Interestingly, GB removes this incentive
so that retailer 1 always charges a higher price than
retailer 2.
Our next comparison shows that the small retailer
will always prefer group purchasing, while the big
retailer might get hurt from such cooperation.
PROPOSITION 6. When retailers are asymmetric in market
base and discount is of linear format, the total quantity
under IP does not depend on DA, and it is always below
that under GB (QGB l4QIP l). GB leads to lower price,
higher quantity, and higher profit for retailer 2 (with smaller
market base) than IP. However, retailer 1 (with larger mar-
ket base) may not always prefer GB. Specifically,
(a) when d & ! 4y3þ12y2þ6y
8y3þ20y2þ12yþ2, there exists DAq ' DA
such that for DA & DAq, retailer 1’s quantity is
higher under IP;
(b) when d & ! y1þ2y, there exists DAp ' DA such that
for DA & DAp, retailer 1’s price is lower under IP;
(c) when k(y, d) ' 0, there exists DAP ' DA such that
for DA & DAP, retailer 1’s profit is higher under IP,
where
kðy; dÞ
¼ 1þ
!
1
1þyþ 2dþ 11þ2y
" ffiffiffiffiffiffi
1þd
1þy
q
! !1þd1þyþ 11þ2y" ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi11þyþ dq!
1
1þyþ 2dþ 1
" ffiffiffiffiffiffi
1þd
1þy
q
! !1þd1þyþ 2dþ 1" ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi11þyþ dq
264
375
+
1þd
1þyþ 2dþ 1
1þd
1þyþ 11þ2y
" #
:
Moreover, DAq ' DAp, DAq ' DAP. That is, if retailer
1’s profit (price) is higher (lower) under IP, then its quan-
tity is higher under IP.
Proposition 6 suggests that the discount scale,
competition intensity, and asymmetry level jointly
affect retailers’ GB decisions. Basically, GB is favor-
able for both retailers when k(y, d) & 0. When
k(y, d) ' 0, the asymmetry between the retailers
plays an important role. Specifically, GB is always
preferable when the retailers are similar, which is
consistent with Proposition 3. If the two retailers are
not alike (i.e., DA & DAP), GB will hurt retailer 1.
Although it is not possible to solve k(y, d)5 0 by
explicitly expressing d as a function of y (or vice
versa), we characterize the region numerically. As
shown in Figure 5, the duopoly model is feasible
when d and y are below the solid curve (above which
the equilibrium solution is invalid with negative
quantities or profits).4 The feasible region is then di-
vided by the dashed curve k(y, d)5 0 into two:
Region I where GB is always advantageous, and Re-
gion II where GB is preferable when asymmetry
level is below the threshold (DA ' DAP). Intuitively,
GB is preferable for any value of d when y5 0. When
competition is intense (e.g., y & 2), the dashed curve
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k(y, d)5 0 is approaching the solid curve, so that the
asymmetry level becomes critical to the GB decision.
When competition is mild (e.g., y ' 2), the cooper-
ation effect will dominate the competition effect
under deep discount (e.g., |d| & 0.28) and GB is
preferable. Otherwise for flat discounts (low |d|),
again the asymmetry level determines whether
retailers will cooperate.
Recall that for the general QDF, the total quantity
and the manufacturer’s revenue under GB do not de-
pend on DA, as shown in Proposition 4. For linear
discount schedules, the total quantity under IP is also
independent of DA, whereas the revenue under IP de-
creases with the level of asymmetry. Similar to the
symmetric case, the revenue comparison depends on
the base price a as follows (see proof of Proposition 4(c)
in the supporting information Appendix S1 for details):
(a) if a & a0, GB leads to higher revenue for sym-
metric retailers and RGB l & RIP l for DA ' DA;
(b) if a1 ' aoa0, there exists a unique value
DAo ' DA, where RGB l & RIP l for DA & DA0;
(c) if aoa1, revenue under IP decreases but remains
higher than that under GB, and RGB loRIP l for
DA ' DA.
We next present the analytical result under the
special case of two-part tariffs.
4.2.2. Two-Part Tariffs (e5 1). Under a two-part
tariff, the unit wholesale price is given by w(q)5 a1d/q
with d40. Two-part tariffs are commonly used in
practice due to their simple structure (see Tirole 1988
and the discussion therein), and have been well studied
in the literature (e.g., Dolan 1987, Ingene and Parry 1995,
Raju and Zhang 2005). If each retailer is required to pay
the manufacturer a constant unit price plus a fixed fee
for shipping and handling (e.g., transportation), this
price schedule would simply be a two-part tariff.
The total cost under a two-part tariff is TC(q)5
aq1d for q40 and TC(0)5 0. By (6) and (10), retailer
i’s profit under IP and GB can be written as
PIP ti ¼
ðqIP ti Þ2
1þ y ! d; and ð13Þ
PGB ti ¼
qGB ti
! "2
1þ y !
d
1þ y
qGB ti
QGB t
' (2
; ð14Þ
respectively. In the initial equilibrium, both retailers
make nonnegative profits by individually purchasing
from the manufacturer. They now consider the option
of cooperation in buying. The equilibrium IP and GB
solutions for two-part tariffs are given in Tables 1 and
2. The conditions that ensure a sensible model are
given in (36)–(38) in the supporting information
Appendix S1. The comparisons between the retailers
and the impact of discount scale and competition in-
tensity are summarized below.
PROPOSITION 7. When retailers are asymmetric in market
base and the discount is a two-part tariff,
(a) retailer 1 (with larger market base) will set a higher
price, and enjoy a higher retail quantity and profit
under either IP or GB compared to retailer 2;
(b) under IP retail price and quantity do not depend on
d, while retail profit is linearly decreasing in d. Also
more intense competition leads to higher retail quan-
tity for both retailers and lower retail price for
retailer 1 under IP.
Under IP, the marginal cost remains constant at a
after the fixed fee d is incurred, although a two-part
tariff, de facto, corresponds to a quantity discount
with decreasing unit wholesale price. Thus, the fixed
fee d behaves as a sunk cost and will not affect each
retailer’s pricing or quantity decision. Note that d
cannot be too high for both retailers to have positive
profits (e.g., d ' 1þ yð Þ A!c!a2þy
# $2
by condition (37) in
Appendix S1). We now compare IP and GB under
two-part tariffs.
PROPOSITION 8. When retailers are asymmetric in market
base and the discount is a two-part tariff,
(a) GB leads to higher retail price and lower retail quan-
tity for both retailers;
(b) both retailers are better off under GB. The profit
advantage of group purchase is monotonically de-
creasing for the large retailer (@ðPGB1 !PIP1 Þ=
@DA ' 0) and monotonically increasing for the
small retailer (@ðPGB2 !PIP2 Þ=@DA & 0);
(c) the manufacturer’s total quantity and revenue are
higher under IP than under GB.
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Conventional wisdom suggests that when buyers
purchase together, they are likely to acquire a higher
quantity at a lower unit wholesale price. However
under two-part tariffs, buyers will actually buy less
under group purchase, regardless of the presence of
competition. As discussed before, under IP the
fixed fee d does not affect each retailer’s quantity
decision. Under GB, retailer i’s payment to the man-
ufacturer is
aqGB ti þ
qGB ti
QGB t
d:
That is, the fixed fee d is shared by retailers based
on the ratio qGB ti =Q
GB t. This serves as an incentive
for each retailer to scale back and buy less under GB.
The profit comparison suggests that if the two
competing retailers currently purchase individually
under a two-part tariff, they will be better off by
switching to GB regardless of their asymmetry level
or competition intensity. Moreover, their cooperation
will always lead to a lower revenue for the manu-
facturer. These results are not surprising given the
special structure of two-part tariffs. Table 4 summa-
rizes the comparison between IP and GB for both
linear schedules and two-part tariffs.
4.2.3. General Steepness e. As the results for the
two special cases differ, it would be interesting to
investigate the system of asymmetric retailers under
general steepness of e. Not surprisingly, for e close to
! 1 prices and quantities behave similarly as under
linear schedules, whereas for e close to 1 they behave
similarly as under two-part tariffs. In this section, we
focus on the comparison of retailer profits and
manufacturer’s revenue between IP and GB. In all
the numerical studies, we restrict to the parameter
range that ensures a sensible model with positive
prices, quantities, and profits.
4.2.3.1. Retailer’s profit: GB Vs. IP. We have shown
that, under linear discount schedules, it is possible to
have the big retailer not willing to cooperate, whereas
the small player always benefits from GB. On the
other hand, under two-part tariffs both retailers prefer
group purchase. Numerical investigation shows that
for eA[! 1, 1], the results obtained under linear dis-
counts are quite robust. As long as the steepness e is
not close to 1, in a competitive and sufficiently asym-
metric environment, GB can be detrimental for the
retailer with a larger market base, whereas the smaller
retailer always benefits from GB. Figure 6 depicts
retailer 1’s relative profit difference under GB and IP,
ðPGB1 !PIP1 Þ=PIP1 for e5 * 0.1, * 0.2, * 0.5, and
! 0.9. Retailer 1’s profit difference for e5 0.9 is al-
ways positive and thus is omitted.
Under GB, retailer 1’s competitive advantage from
its larger market base is weakened because now both
retailers have the same unit wholesale price. On the
other hand, the extra demand from retailer 2 helps
retailer 1 obtain a better discount from the manu-
facturer. When the benefit from demand aggregation
is sufficient to cover its loss in competitive advan-
tage (e.g., when asymmetry level is low), retailer 1
will join group purchase. Otherwise if retailer 2 be-
comes much more competitive through GB, retailer 1
will receive a lower profit, and naturally, choose not
to group buy. As a result, while the small retailer is
Table 4 Comparison between IP and GB (Asymmetric Retailers)
Linear schedule (e5 ! 1) Two-part tariff (e5 1)
Retailer 1 (larger market base) Retailer 2 Retailer i, i5 1, 2
Retailer price pGB l1 wpIP l1 depending on d, y, DA pGB l2 ' pIP l2 pGB ti & pIP ti
Retailer quantity qGB l1 wqIP l1 depending on d, y, DA qGB l2 & qIP l2 qGB ti ' qIP ti
Retailer profit PGB l1 wPIP l1 depending on d, y, DA PGB l2 & pIP l2 PGB ti & PIP ti
Total quantity QGB l & QIP l QGB t ' QIP t
Manufacturer revenue RGB lxRIP l RGB t ' RIP t
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always interested in forming a group with the large
retailer, such cooperation may never materialize.
Discussions from online GB forums show that
people have very different opinions regarding local
buying groups. While some agree that such coopera-
tion is more manageable because logistics are easier
and there are no trust problems, others believe that
cooperation among local members will not be advan-
tageous because they are competing in the same
market. This study shows that both concerns are valid,
and a careful evaluation is needed for the large retailer.
Our results add a caveat to the general belief that
GB always benefits buyers. Some buying groups
consist of local retailers who might compete with
each other. For example, Stagbuyinggroup.com, a
company that specializes in sport, outdoor, and lei-
sure sectors, has over 400 independent retailers all
over the United Kingdom, with some outlets in
proximity to each other. Before engaging in any pur-
chasing cooperation, retailers should be aware of the
possible outcomes depending on the competition
and their differences.
4.2.3.2. Manufacturer’s revenue: GB vs. IP. We have
shown that under linear schedules, manufacturer’s
revenue can be higher under GB if the base price a
is sufficiently high, whereas under two-part tariffs,
revenue is always lower under GB. Numerical inves-
tigation suggests that GB can lead to higher revenue
for steepness e not close to 1 and sufficiently high
asymmetry. When e is close to 1, GB always results in
a lower revenue.
4.3. Asymmetric Efficiency
We now study another form of asymmetry created by
the efficiency gap between the two retailers (Dc6¼0)
while assuming DA5 0. Without loss of generality, we
consider positive Dc only, i.e., retailer 2 is more effi-
cient. For comparisons between IP and GB, the results
do not differ qualitatively from those under market
base asymmetry. Hence, we briefly comment on the
insights specific for the case of asymmetric efficiency
(the solutions are available from the authors).
For two-part tariffs, the comparisons are similar to
Propositions 7–8. For linear discounts, we find that
retailer 2 will always set a lower price, have higher
quantity and higher profit than (the less efficient) re-
tailer 1, under both GB and IP. This result slightly
differs from that under asymmetric market base.
Parallel to the case of asymmetric market base, the
conditions identified in Proposition 6 will lead to cut-
off points Dcp, Dcq, and DcP such that the price,
quantity, and profit are higher in IP for the more effi-
cient retailer 2 when Dc is beyond the cutoff points,
respectively. Concerning the manufacturer, we have a
similar conclusion as in Proposition 4. For general
steepness, numerical investigation confirms that re-
tailer 1 will always prefer GB, while retailer 2 may not
always cooperate when efficiency gap Dc is large and
discount level |d| is low.
4.4. Asymmetry in Both Market Base and Efficiency
We have shown that either dimension of asymmetry
has a similar impact on retailers’ GB decisions. For the
general case where firms differ in both dimensions,
there are two possible cases: (1) DADco0, i.e., the
retailer with a larger market base also has a lower unit
operating cost; and (2) DADc40, i.e., the retailer with
a small market base is more efficient. Usually a high
market base is correlated with low operating costs due
to economies of scale. Nevertheless we sometimes
do observe small retailers who excel in operational
efficiency.
For case (1), all the results obtained for asymmetry
in one dimension still hold. In fact, when DADco0,
the asymmetry between retailers is strengthened in
the sense that the ‘‘strong’’ retailer becomes even
stronger. For case (2), results depend on which asym-
metry dominates. In particular, if DA & Dc(112y),
the asymmetry in market base outweighs the ampli-
fied gap in operational efficiency, and the retailer with a
larger market base is the ‘‘strong’’ one. Otherwise if
DAoDc(112y), the efficient retailer is the strong player.
Similar as before, the weak retailer will always prefer
GB, while the strong one may or may not cooperate.
Note that the asymmetry in operational efficiency (Dc)
is reinforced by competition through the multiplier
112y. For the special case y ¼ DA!Dc2Dc , the two
asymmetries will cancel out, and these two retailers
are virtually symmetric. This implies that when each
retailer is good at one dimension but not both, GB is
more likely to materialize. This is an interesting result,
which suggests that retailers of different strengths are
more likely to cooperate.
5. Extension
5.1. Nonlinear Demand Functions
In many competitive equilibrium analyses, linear
demand functions are often used because of their
tractability in providing analytical results. Yet we
expect demand nonlinearity in many real problems. In
the investigation below, we supplement the preceding
discussion by analyzing three nonlinear demand
functions commonly used in the literature (Choi
1991, Kadiyali et al. 2000, Lee and Staelin 1997,
Moorthy 1988, Vives 1999)
ðaÞ qi ¼ Aip!mi pnj ; Ai & 0; m41; 0 ' n ' m;
ðbÞ qi ¼ eAi!mpiþnpj ; Ai & 0; 0 ' n ' m; and
ðcÞ qi ¼ Ai !m ln pi þ n ln pj; Ai & 0; 0 ' n ' m:
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n is a substitutability parameter; when it is zero, each
retailer’s demand is independent of the other re-
tailer’s price. m & n & 0 is required to ensure that
retailer i’s demand is more sensitive to its own price
than to the competitor’s and the total demand does
not increase when both retail prices increase. (a) is
known as the constant elasticity demand function,
where m and n are retailer i’s demand elasticities to
its own price and to the competitor’s price, respec-
tively. In the absence of quantity discounts and group
purchase, this class of functions is known to result in
price strategies that are independent of the compet-
itor’s strategy (Choi 1991, Moorthy 1988). Such
property no longer holds under general quantity dis-
counts. (b) and (c), referred to as semi-log demand
functions, are commonly used in empirical studies,
where (b) is sometimes called exponential demand func-
tion (Lee and Staelin 1997).
Owing to the functional complexity, analytical so-
lutions are elusive for these nonlinear demand
functions. For each demand function, we derive the
first-order conditions under IP and GB, based on
which we find the equilibrium numerically. We ex-
periment with a wide range of parameters by
normalizing A to 1 and c to 0.1, and varying a be-
tween 0.2 and 0.8, e between ! 1 and 1, and d across
feasible values. All of the numerical studies are
carried within the range that ensures individual
rationality and nonnegativity. Our analysis suggests
that results obtained under the linear demand func-
tion (1) are robust. Specifically, cooperation may not
materialize in presence of sufficient asymmetry be-
cause the stronger retailer can get hurt from joint
purchasing. Also, the manufacturer’s revenue can be
higher under GB.
One result that differs concerns the constant elas-
ticity demand. Proposition 3 shows that symmetric
retailers always prefer group purchase under the lin-
ear demand function, a result that also holds for (b)
and (c). However for (a), symmetric retailers may get
hurt from cooperation when m is low, n is medium,
and steepness e is not close to 1 (e.g., eo0.3).
To understand this result, note that, in general, de-
mand elasticity increases with price (e.g., linear and
semi-log demand functions). That is, consumers be-
come more price sensitive when the product becomes
more expensive. However, under constant elasticity
demand, especially when elasticity m is low, a signifi-
cant change in price may not alter demand as much.
As n varies from 0 to m, a more intense competition
leads to lower retail price and higher quantity. When
competition is fairly weak (i.e., n , 0), the cooperation
effect dominates and GB is preferable. When compe-
tition becomes mild for medium values of n, IP is
preferable because the low demand elasticity m allows
each retailer to charge a much higher price under IP
than under GB, at almost no risk in losing demand.
When competition is intense (e.g., n , m), GB is again
advantageous because it helps soften the competition.
Note that GB is again preferable for symmetric re-
tailers under higher values of m, where the higher
demand elasticity depresses the retail price under IP,
and GB will again be preferable regardless of the
competition level. Overall our numerical analysis
suggests that results obtained under the linear de-
mand function are robust, except for the constant
elastic demand with low demand elasticity and mild
competition. For parameters in this range, retailers
might continue to be worse off under GB when they
become slightly different, so that even the weak
player may prefer IP.
5.2. Three or More Competing Retailers
In the investigation of how competition affects retail-
ers’ cooperation decision, we follow the literature
(e.g., Ingene and Parry 1995, Tsay and Agrawal 2000)
by considering duopoly with two retailers. In reality,
some groups consist of multiple retailers who vary in
size. For example, members of NetPlus include some
distributors with sales at US$50 million, two with
sales in US$40 million and a half dozen or so with
sales more than US$20 million. In this section, we fo-
cus on market base asymmetry and consider the
special case of two symmetric small retailers and one
big retailer, which sheds light on the analysis of three
or more competing retailers.
Let retailers 1 and 2 be the two symmetric retailers
with the same market base, and retailer 3 be the big
retailer (A15A2 ' A3). Similar as before, we obtain
retailer i’s demand function from Shapley and Shubik
(1969) as
qi ¼ Ai ! pi þ y 1n
Xn
j¼1
pj ! pi
0@ 1A; y & 0:
Define DA ¼ 13ðA3 ! A1Þ so that A ¼ 13ðA1 þ A2þ
A3Þ, A1 ¼ A2 ¼ A! DA, A3 ¼ Aþ 2DA. Again, DA
measures the level of asymmetry between the big re-
tailer and the small retailers. The analysis is similar to
the duopoly case, and is omitted here. We explore the
coalition formation for general steepness numerically,
and report one representative example in Table 5. Our
major findings are as follows:
1. If the asymmetry level is high, the big retailer
will not cooperate with either small retailer, a
result consistent with Proposition 6. In this case,
the two small retailers will group buy. This pos-
sibly explains that in 2003, Mexico’s three largest
retailers, Grupo Gigante, Organization Soriana,
and Comercial Mexicana, joined forces in a buy-
ing and operations alliance in order to compete
against the Wal-Mart–owned Walmex. Also,
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large grocery buying groups in France typically
refuse members with too low a turnover, while
small retailers sometimes form their own groups
(Dobson Consulting 1999).
2. For medium or low asymmetry levels, for a wide
range of parameters, all three players would
form one group. However, sometimes the big re-
tailer will be interested in cooperating with one,
but not both small retailers. Basically after the big
retailer and one small retailer form a subcoali-
tion, they might find it unattractive to further
include the third player. To some extent, the
formation of the subcoalition enlarges the asym-
metry gap so that no further cooperation takes
place.
Our limited analysis shows that ultimately compe-
tition together with asymmetry drives the decision of
whether to group purchase. However, the general
problem of three or more competing retailers can be
quite complex because players can form subcoalitions
that enlarge or shrink the asymmetry gap. The full
investigation of this problem, although beyond the
scope of this paper, is a promising direction for future
research.
6. Discussion and Conclusion
Although GB has been widely used in a variety of
markets and contexts, there is a lack of decision anal-
ysis for firms who are involved. In this paper, we
construct a general model of competing retailers with
two possible strategies: IP or GB, given a quantity
discount schedule from the manufacturer. Based on
linear demand curves, we offer a number of insights
on retailers’ GB decisions. Intuitively, GB is always
advantageous in the absence of competition. Under
competition, symmetric retailers are always better off
under GB. Interestingly, when discount is deep and
competition is mild, symmetric retailers might prefer
more intense competition when they cooperate. On
the other hand, a deeper discount is not always ben-
eficial to retailers under IP.
When retailers are asymmetric (i.e., differ in market
base or operational efficiency), GB clearly helps the
‘‘weak’’ player (e.g., the retailer with smaller market
base or higher operational cost), while the ‘‘strong’’
player may or may not prefer cooperation, depending
on the competition level, the discount schedule, and
the level of asymmetry. In fact, GB in general weakens
the competitive advantage of the strong player, who at
the same time enjoys a lower wholesale price that be-
comes available because of its rival’s demand.
Especially when the asymmetry gap is large, the loss
in competitive advantage will outweigh the gain from
joint purchasing so that GB may not materialize. In-
terestingly, GB is more likely to form between retailers
who are competitive in different, but not all dimen-
sions. Our investigation with nonlinear demand
curves suggests that results obtained under linear de-
mand curves are robust, except for some minor
differences under the constant elasticity demand with
low elasticity.
Our results are based on several assumptions. First,
we assume that the quantity discount schedule is
exogenously given, which is reasonable under the
Robinson–Patman Act. However, sometimes the
quantities of buying groups are beyond the price
menu specified by the manufacturer, and they need
to negotiate the price with the seller. In the current
study, we examine the retailers’ perspective and only
Table 5 Profit Comparison for Three Retailers!
DA
Retailer 1 profit (small retailer) Retailer 3 profit (large retailer)
GB(1, 2, 3) GB(1, 2) GB(1, 3) IP GB(2, 3) GB(1, 2, 3) GB(1, 2) GB(1, 3) IP
0 0.07835 0.07775 0.07775 0.07670 0.07653 0.07835 0.07653 0.07775 0.07670
0.1 0.06313 0.06239 0.06269 0.06150 0.06135 0.11370 0.11192 0.11313 0.11210
0.2 0.04955 0.04872 0.04925 0.04798 0.04783 0.15563 0.15398 0.15512 0.15419
0.3 0.03762 0.03674 0.03743 0.03614 0.03599 0.20412 0.20273 0.20373 0.20295
0.4 0.02733 0.02643 0.02723 0.02596 0.02582 0.25918 0.25816 0.25895 0.25839
0.5 0.01868 0.01781 0.01865 0.01747 0.01733 0.32080 0.32027 0.32080 0.32050
0.6 0.01167 0.01088 0.01169 0.01064 0.01052 0.38899 0.38909 0.38927 0.38931
0.7 0.00630 0.00564 0.00635 0.00549 0.00539 0.46374 0.46462 0.46438 0.46483
0.8 0.00257 0.00210 0.00263 0.00203 0.00195 0.54507 0.54693 0.54615 0.54711
0.9 0.00049 0.00026 0.00053 0.00025 0.00022 0.63295 0.63616 0.63466 0.63627
!Group binding (GB) (1, 2, 3) means all three retailers group purchase. GB (1, 2) means only the two small retailers group purchase. GB (1, 3) means only retailer 1 and
retailer 3 group purchase, while leaving retailer 2 alone. IP means all three retailers individual purchase. GB (2, 3) means retailer 2 and 3 group purchase, while leaving
retailer 1 alone.
(A5 1; c5 0.1; a5 0.3; d5 ! 0.01; y5 2; e5 ! 0.5).
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consider the manufacturer’s revenue. An opportunity
to build upon this work is to consider the manufac-
turer’s optimal strategy when retailers purchase
together.
Secondly, we have shown that under the commonly
used uniform allocation rule, the retailers pay the
same unit price in group purchase and the strong re-
tailer may not want to participate. In this case, there
might exist other allocation rules that enable the co-
operation and result in a win–win outcome. In
practice, buying groups operate on egalitarian princi-
ples, whereas others arrange better deals for large
members because they contribute more to the aggre-
gate purchase (Lindsay 2009). The majority literature
on cost-sharing mechanisms has focused on the
normative properties (e.g., fairness), without consid-
ering competition (Hougaard and Thorlund-Petersen
2000, Moulin 1996). One important direction is to
examine alternative allocation schemes when buyers
compete.
Our paper makes the intuitive assumption that the
total cost increases with purchasing quantity. Thus, it
is never advantageous for retailers to hold back any
inventory (i.e., purchase more than they can sell).
However, discount schedules in practice often include
discrete breakpoints, under which the total cost might
remain the same or even fall if more units are pur-
chased over certain ranges. The area of the price
schedule where this occurs is called a ‘‘window’’
(Wilcox et al. 1987), and its existence can be explained
by the easiness in describing discrete discounts in
practice (Carlton and Waldmann 2008). Prior litera-
ture has studied buyers’ ordering decision in the
presence of such opportunities (e.g., Arcelus and
Rowcroft 1992, Sethi 1984). Future research can ex-
amine whether holding back would affect the
economics of GB.
This is the first paper that studies GB in a channel
context. Another relevant question is whether the
intensity of rivalry at the retail stage has any impli-
cations for the total surplus available between the two
levels. For example, for German grocery buying
groups, the intense competition between members
appears in turn to lead to greater pressure on sellers to
accept lower margins, while the negotiations between
buying groups and sellers are more relaxed in the
United Kingdom (Dobson Consulting 1999). By con-
sidering the manufacturer as an active member, future
study could examine channel coordination under GB.
In this paper, we have not considered other value-
added services (advertising, logistics, etc.) that are
usually part of the benefits of a buying group, which
can be incorporated in future studies. Our equilibrium
analysis relies on the assumption of common knowl-
edge of all model parameters. Especially, the
information on rival’s market base and operational
cost is needed for retailers to choose their strategies.
An important direction is to examine firms’ GB deci-
sion under incomplete information.
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Notes
1Examples include the well-known grocery chain Indepen-
dent Grocers Association (or IGA), and Ace Hardware,
TruServ, and Do It Best in retail hardware (Dana 2006).
2Under certain conditions (e.g., very intense competition), it
is possible for one or both retailers to exit the market to
avoid negative profits. As we study GB formation in a com-
petitive environment, we restrict to the range of parameters
where the duopoly equilibrium exists under both IP and GB.
The issue of market exit or entry under GB is beyond the
scope of this paper.
3Here we follow the standard economic argument that,
when supply of a good expands, the price falls (assuming
the demand curve is downward sloping) and consumer
surplus increases.
4This curve is generated by conditions (31), (32), and (34)
that ensure nonnegative prices, quantities, and profits for
asymmetric retailers.
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